LAISSEZ FAIRE VERSUS DIRIGISM: PARADIGMS AND FAIRY TALES
Erle
Frayne D. Argonza
Across the continents,
where markets have predominance in the economic sphere, there has always been
the antipodal tendentialities of laissez faire and dirigisme. The
bone of contention has been the state’s role in the economy. These
tendentialities have surely represented two (2) hard-line oppositional streams.
Mercantilism, the
progenitor of dirigism, contended that regulation should govern production,
distribution, consumption and exchange. The (interventionist) state should be
at the center of regulation, with the central goal of all economic pursuits
being the accumulation of the wealth for King. Old Nationalism had held on to
this contention, with the revision that wealth should be accumulated for the
nation as a whole and no longer merely for the King, wealth that is
correspondingly allocated to the folks in the form of wages and welfare (this
‘wealth for nation’ line is admittedly a concession to the Smithian physiocracy,
a competitor discourse). Only the state, not the market, can best perform
redistributive responsibilities for welfare, jobs and wages. Necessarily,
development should be undertaken with strong state regulations in the four
intervention areas mentioned. The Keynesian revolution revived the dirigist
contention, using a demand-side premise, and held sway across the globe for
around half a century since its inception.
Laissez faire, whose
earliest articulators were the physiocrats, opposed dirigist doctrines with
extreme zeal. Accordingly, the state should only intervene in matters of
defense, justice and public works, and should keep its hands off the market.
Accumulating wealth is a matter of private sector concern (industrialists and
landlords), while free trade must be the condition of international exchange
and distribution. Even matters of welfare must be left to market mechanisms to
provide. Development efforts, i.e. the ones undertaken by ‘3rd
world’ economies, must follow the laissez faire path. The logic behind the
contention is that the market will produce the entrepreneurs who will be
enticed to embark on bold ventures should they be left on their own to take off
‘infantile enterprises’.
The problem arises when,
due to the predominance of non-market mechanisms, such as clientelist relations
and redistribution-based exchange systems (haciendas, latifundia), development
could hardly take off at all. In cases where entrepreneurs are of residual
numbers, such as the one demonstrated by Philippine experience, laissez faire
strategies would prove pathetic in results. This entrepreneurial scarcity had
justified the adoption of dirigist policy frameworks, the principle ones being
those that guided the ‘import substitution industrialization’ of 1947-1968. Various
3rd world states have sponsored the dirigist path, employing diverse
models (socialist, mixed market-socialist), with fairly good results for many
of them. The articulators of such states have argued that no country had ever
prospered thru the laissez faire route, and that laissez faire can only work
out when development had reached a highly mature level when consumerism propels
growth, and where economic fundamentals are very strong and stable.
Many developing
economies actually encountered tremendous snags as their states chiefly
sponsored development efforts. Rent-seekers of every kind appeared on the
scene, serving as barriers to the effective entry of possible investors from
among potential competitors. In the Philippine case, asset reform in the
agrarian sector had been a perennial failure, thus further complicating the
already complex maize of structural problems. What happened, according to the
defenders of laissez faire doctrines, was that dirigisme made the ensconced
patrimonial groups become further entrenched, thus leading to a vicious cycle
of slow growth, high poverty, high unemployment, and relative stagnation.
Such a situation served
as the impetus for embracing neo-liberal reforms over the last twenty-five (25)
years by the developing economies, the Philippines included. Laissez faire
returned with a vengeance, popularizing free trade in the international sphere,
and structural adjustments in the domestic sphere and public sector, to note:
liberalization, deregulation, privatization, liberalized currency
markets/devaluation, down-sizing, minimal/residual fiscal stimulus &
budgets for social services, tax reforms and decentralization. Such a policy
regime of ‘structural adjustments’ were instrumental in integrating national
markets into a globalized one where there is freer flow of tradable goods,
investments, information and labor. Not only that, the antipathy of
foundational physiocracy towards manufacturing (biased for agriculture)
returned, as cheap imports (owing to liberalized trade) destroyed established
industries leading to ‘de-industrialization’.
Where are we twenty-five
(25) years after instituting market reforms under the aegis of ‘structural
adjustments’ (note: we began through the ‘structural adjustment loans’ of the
World Bank, c. 1979)? National income continues to grow at dismally low rates,
poverty had increased during the latter phase of the reforms (decreased only
recently), unemployment remains high amid positive growth, and our
developmental stage continues to be stuck up in the ‘growth stage’ (failed to
reach ‘maturity’). Globalization, with its attendant ‘structural adjustment’
policies, has weakened nations, even caused fragmentation in others, a fact
that had likewise been replicated in the Philippines with its separatist
movements. Free trade had destroyed domestic industries (the USA case was hit so hard by this one), as some
had to fold up (Marikina
shoes exemplifies the Philippine case) and transfer elsewhere (Procter &
Gamble-Philippine is an example). With weak or nil ‘safety nets’, chances are
that many producers (e.g. fruits, vegetables) will lose against cheaply-priced
imports. One thing is clear for the case of many developing economies,
including the Philippines:
market reforms failed miserably to get them to development maturity, even as it
set back the development path of others.
So if both dirigisme and
laissez faire have been failing in making life better for the nation and the
majority of the people, what discourse than can work out to salve the ailments
of most developing states? Expectedly, a ‘renaissance of nation-states’ has
become the wave of the present, with many of its articulators defending a
return to dirigisme in its old form—in its highly protectionist form. I used to
be among such articulators, even as I now argue that Old Nationalism can have
deleterious results when pushed to the extremes. We can’t wish globalization
away, it is here to stay and galvanize some more, even as it challenges us all
to path-find the opportunities that it can offer while neutralizing the threats
that could result from it. In other words, re-echoing Herr Reich’s and Mdm
Arroyo’s elucidations on the subject, I am now wont to advocate for a New
Nationalism or neo-nationalism, a discourse that advances beyond the narrow
confines of extremist dirigisme and laissez faire.
Let me move next to the
key premises and contentions of ‘new nationalism’-Philippine style.
[From: Erle Frayne D.
Argonza, “New Nationalism: Grandeur and Glory at Work!”. August 2004. For the Office of External Affairs –
Political Cabinet Cluster, Office of the President, Malacaňan Palace.]